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I. Introduction 
Descartes’s scattered remarks on the nature of human freedom are individually intriguing 
and collectively confusing. Several seemingly divergent patterns of thought are present in 
his writings, creating ample fodder for scholarly debate. Reactions range from allegations of 
incoherence to inconsistency to change over time. Although I don’t think any of these 
charges stick, I won’t be directly engaging with each controversy in the expansive literature. 
Instead, I’ll outline an interpretation that promises to vindicate the coherence, consistency, 
and stability of Descartes’s view—a view of considerable philosophical (and not just histori-
cal) interest. This is just what we should expect from someone who is not only highly intel-
ligent and attentive to detail, but also prone to systematicity. 
 After some preliminary remarks (in §II), I set the stage for my preferred interpretation 
by canvassing Descartes’s central commitments concerning human freedom and showing 
how they give rise to an important puzzle, one that is presented in a particularly precise and 
perspicuous way by what I call the “Anti-Enlightened Freedom Argument” (in §III). I then 
briefly examine two potential solutions to the puzzle (in §IV), both of which appeal to an 
ambiguity in Descartes’s talk of ability. The first follows Campbell (1999) in interpreting 
Descartes along traditional compatibilist lines; the second follows Ragland (2016) in inter-
preting Descartes as a limited libertarian—i.e. as someone who accepts the reality of free-
dom but denies it is compatible with nearly all forms of determinism. I then provide an al-
ternative interpretation of Descartes that shares similarities with those of Campbell and 
Ragland, but enjoys additional benefits besides (in §V). I do so by appealing to the impor-
tant but regularly overlooked distinction between possessing a power, exercising a power, and 
being in a position to exercise a power. The goal of this paper is thus to articulate a novel inter-
pretation of Descartes that resolves an important tension at the heart of his view. 
II. Preliminary Remarks 
My main focus in what follows will be how—on Descartes’s view—freedom relates to a cer-
tain form of determinism. Determinism is the thesis that, for any time t, the laws together 
 Many thanks to Andrew Bailey, Don Garrett, John Maier, Lex Newman, Elliot Paul, Scott Ragland, and 1
three anonymous referees for generous comments that led to substantial improvements. I owe a special 
debt of gratitude to Elliot Paul for getting me hooked on Descartes as a beginning graduate student, and 
to Scott Ragland for much encouragement since.
 References to Descartes are ‘CSM’ (1984-1985) and ‘CSMK’ (1991).2
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with some proposition about the state of the universe at t entail the state of the universe at 
every time later than t.  Although Descartes himself doesn’t directly address the issue, he 3
does discuss doctrines in the vicinity. In particular, Descartes’s metaphysical framework 
raises the spectre of three distinct sorts of determinism: 
physical determinism: for any time t, the complete physical state of the world at t 
together with the laws of nature entails the subsequent 
physical state of the world. 
intellectual determinism: for any time t and subject S, the total intellectual state of S 
at t together with the psychological laws entails the subse-
quent state of S’s will. 
theological determinism: every event that occurs is preordained (and hence logically 
guaranteed) by a divine willing.  4
Although Descartes’s views vis-à-vis each are somewhat vexed and deserve extended treat-
ment, the focus of this paper will be squarely on the determination of the will by the intel-
lect.  Some background concerning Descartes’s metaphysics of mind is thus in order. 5
 Like much of the contemporary debate surrounding human freedom, Descartes is 
concerned with the voluntary actions that we perform, and for which we are morally re-
sponsible. In the Meditations and elsewhere, however, Descartes is especially concerned with 
acts of the mind, or thinking substance. According to Descartes, the essence of mind is 
thought, understood as “everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately 
aware of it” (CSM II, 113). There are two main kinds of thoughts: 
All the modes of thinking that we experience within ourselves can be brought under two 
general headings: perception, or the operation of the intellect, and volition, or the opera-
tion of the will. Sensory perception, imagination and pure understanding are simply var-
ious modes of perception; desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt are various 
modes of willing. (CSM I, 204; italics added) 
As this division of labor suggests, the locus of human freedom is the will—an intrinsic men-
tal power—and its activity. The exercise of the will results in volitions, or acts of will. In-
 There are other things that might be meant by ‘determinism’. For example, in their synoptic survey of 3
seventeenth-century views of freedom, Sleigh, Chappell, and Della Rocca (1998) define ‘determinism’ as 
the thesis that “whatever happens in the world is brought about by causes other than itself” (1195). 
This is importantly diﬀerent from the more contemporary characterization of determinism provided in 
the main text. The latter is closer to the thesis that whatever happens in the world is necessitated by caus-
es other than itself, though the contemporary characterization says nothing specifically about causation.
 I’ve excluded reference to laws in the statement of theological determinism because I’m not sure what 4
such laws would be—other than immutable divine willings, that is.
 For discussion of Descartes’s view of causation—both physical and mental—see Schmaltz (2008), 5
Chapters 2-4. For discussion of Descartes’s view of the relationship between human freedom and divine 
providence, see Wee (2006, 2014), Cunning (2010), and Ragland (2005, 2016), among others.
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deed, Descartes identifies the will with the faculty of free choice: all acts of will are free, and 
all free acts are acts of will—acting freely is “the essence of will” (CSM II, 117).  6
 There are two broad kinds of volitions: choices—i.e. acts of pursuit or avoidance—and 
judgments—i.e. acts of aﬃrmation, denial, and suspension. The fact that judgments are acts 
of will, and hence something over which we have (direct or indirect) voluntary control, is 
repeatedly made explicit (e.g. the appendix to the Fifth Replies), and the fact that we judge 
freely plays a key role in Descartes’s larger epistemological project. ,  Despite being funda7 8 -
mentally volitional in nature, judgments require the operation of the intellect as well. For 
judgments have content, and it is the intellect that provides the content. As Descartes puts 
it, whenever “we direct our will towards something, we always have some sort of under-
standing of some aspect of it” (CSM II, 259), and it is the intellect that enables us “to per-
ceive the ideas which are subjects for possible judgments” (CSM II, 39). Intellectual percep-
tion is thus “a prerequisite of judgment”—any judgment concerning a proposition p re-
quires (at least some) awareness of p (CSM I, 307). Analogous claims are true of choices. 
Call this the intellectual constraint on the will. 
 Descartes took judgments and choices to be constrained by the intellect in a second 
way as well. For not only must something be presented (however obscurely) in our mind in 
order to be a possible object of our judgment or choice, it must also have at least a sem-
blance (however dim) of truth or goodness (e.g., CSM I, 392; CSM II, 291-92; CSMK, 56). 
The appearance of truth or goodness is what inclines the will towards the possible object of 
judgment or choice, though the will needn’t always act on such inclinations. Call this the 
reasons constraint on the will.  9
 Although Descartes takes the will to be a faculty or power of the mind, he denies that it occupies a 6
discrete region of the mind; on the contrary, the “soul has within it no diversity of parts” (CSM I, 346) 
and “the term ‘faculty’ denotes nothing but a potentiality” (CSM I, 305).
 For example, in the Fourth Meditation Descartes confronts the problem of epistemic evil (or error)—7
the problem, in brief, of how to reconcile the existence of an all-powerful, perfectly good God with the 
widespread existence of error, or false belief. Descartes’s theodicy hinges on judgments being acts of 
will, and hence free, because it enables him to locate the source of and responsibility for error entirely in 
us—and, in particular, in the misuse of our will—rather than God. The similarities of this approach to 
the Augustinian solution to the problem of moral evil, or sin, are obvious. This interpretation of 
Descartes’s theodicy is not without detractors, however. For a diﬀerent take on Descartes’s theodicy, see 
David Cunning (2007). (Thanks to an anonymous referee for the reference.)
 Descartes’s theory of judgment notably departs from the prevailing Scholastic Aristotelian tradition, 8
which located judgments in the intellect. For discussion, see Kenny (1972) and Greenberg (manuscript).
 This is why the so-called “method of doubt” is crucial for Descartes’s purposes in the Meditations. For 9
as Descartes makes clear in the appendix to the Fifth Set of Objections and Replies, one cannot with-
hold assent unless one has reason to do so—however slight and ‘so to speak metaphysical’ (CSM II, 
270). In extricating the mind from its ‘preconceived ideas’, the entertaining of reasons for doubt is 
therefore more than a methodological aid—it’s a methodological requirement (cf. Vitz 2010). If, on the 
contrary, suspension of judgment and disbelief were under the direct control of the will without any 
influence of the intellect, and so could be achieved merely by deciding to do so, the elaborate exercise of 
entertaining increasingly threatening skeptical scenarios would be unnecessary.
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 In the next section I canvass some of Descartes’s central commitments concerning 
freedom (§III), and then introduce an important puzzle they engender (§IV). 
III. Cartesian Commitments 
Although much of what Descartes wrote concerning the nature of freedom is subject to con-
troversy, there is little doubt about his views concerning the reality of freedom: “That there 
is freedom in our will [is] so evident that it must be counted among the first and most 
common notions that are innate in us” (CSM I, 205-6). Thus: 
1. Free Will Thesis: Humans act (choose, judge) freely. 
As is standard, Descartes takes there to be an intimate connection between freedom and 
moral responsibility. For example, in the Principles he writes: 
It is a supreme perfection in man that he acts voluntarily, that is, freely; this makes him 
in a special way the author of his actions and deserving of praise for what he does. (CSM 
I, 205; cf. CSMK, 277) 
Acting freely is therefore suﬃcient for moral responsibility. It is also necessary, as evidenced 
by the following passage from the Passions: 
I see only one thing in us which could give us good reason for esteeming ourselves, 
namely, the exercise of our free will and the control we have over our volitions. For we 
can reasonably be praised or blamed only for actions that depend upon this free will. 
(CSM I, 384; cf. CSMK, 325) 
More formally, Descartes thinks that, for any subject S and action (choice, judgment) φ:  10
2. Responsibility-Freedom Thesis: S is morally responsible for φ-ing only if S φ-s freely. 
 But what is it to act freely, according to Descartes? Here controversy abounds. 
Descartes’s most explicit and extended attempt to characterize the essence of the will, and 
hence freedom, appears in the Fourth Meditation. The immediate context concerns the sim-
ilarity between our will and that of God’s: 
[I]t is above all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the 
image and likeness of God. For although God’s will is incomparably greater than mine 
[in various respects]…nevertheless it does not seem any greater than mine when consid-
ered as will in the essential and strict sense. (CSM II, 40) 
He then continues: 
This is because the will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, to 
aﬃrm or deny, to pursue or to avoid); or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when 
the intellect puts something forward for aﬃrmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, 
 See Jayasekera (2016) for discussion of the role responsibility plays in Descartes’s theory of judgment.10
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our inclinations are such that we do not feel we are determined by any external force. (CSM II, 
40; italics added) 
This passage is notable not only because it explicitly attempts to characterize the essence of 
the will, but also because it oﬀers two seemingly diﬀerent characterizations, side-by-side. 
Initially, the will is identified as a two-way power—i.e., “the ability to do or not to do some-
thing”. (Note that, like Descartes, I’ll be using ‘power’ and ‘ability’ interchangeably.) This 
suggests, at a minimum, the following constraint on acting freely, for any action φ:: 
3. Two-Way Ability Thesis: S φ-s freely only if S has the ability not to φ. ,  11 12
The Two-Way Ability Thesis receives support from a variety of texts. For example, in a note 
composed around 1645 (henceforth, ‘the 1645 note’), Descartes insists that the will has the 
“positive faculty of determining [it]self to one or other of two contraries” with respect to all 
of its actions (CSMK, 245).  Further support comes from the Principles: 13
[I]t is a supreme perfection in man that he acts voluntarily, that is, freely; this makes 
him in a special way the author of his actions and deserving of praise for what he does. 
We do not praise automatons for accurately producing all the movements they were de-
signed to perform, because the production of these movements occurs necessarily. It is 
the designer who is praised for constructing such carefully-made devices; for in con-
structing them he acted not out of necessity but freely. By the same principle, when we 
embrace the truth, our doing so voluntarily is much more to our credit than would be the 
case if we could not do otherwise. (CSM I, 205; italics added) 
The diﬀerence between humans and automatons—the reason we are morally responsible for 
our actions, but they are not—thus boils down to the fact that we act freely, and they don’t 
(i.e. the Responsibility-Freedom Thesis). In explaining this point, however, Descartes con-
trasts our acting voluntarily, or freely, with that of acting out of necessity and then proceeds 
to seemingly equate our doing something “voluntarily” with our ability to “do otherwise”. 
 This of course raises the question of what such an ability amounts to. Does it require, 
for example, that both φ-ing and not-φ-ing be genuinely open to you, holding fixed the state 
of the universe at or immediately prior to the moment of choice? Or does it merely require 
something weaker? This issue will loom large in what follows. Whatever Descartes happens 
to mean, however, it’s somewhat odd that he immediately proceeds to oﬀer another—and 
 The Two-Way Ability Thesis is oftentimes called the “Principle of Alternate Possibilities” (or “PAP”, 11
for short). This can be confusing, however, since Frankfurt’s (1969) original principle of that name con-
cerned moral responsibility rather than freedom. See Fischer (1999) for elaboration.
 I’m suppressing time-indices for simplicity—and thereby bypassing certain controversies.12
 Though the note has traditionally been taken to be a letter intended for Mesland, the details concern13 -
ing its exact date and intended recipient (if any) are subject to dispute. See Lennon (2013) for careful 
examination of the historical evidence.
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not obviously equivalent—characterization of freedom as self-determination, or the (felt) ab-
sence of external force.  This, in turn, suggests: 14
4. Self-Determination Thesis: S φ-s freely only if S is self-determining with respect to φ. 
The statements flanking the ‘or rather’ (vel potius) thus introduce a prima facie ambiguity. 
Does acting freely require being able to choose between alternatives, or does it require act-
ing in the absence of external force (i.e. of our own accord)—or both? There is scholarly 
disagreement on this point. As Schmaltz (2008) notes, it is common to view the two claus-
es as oﬀering “two diﬀerent kinds of freedom, with the first clause indicating a ‘freedom of 
indiﬀerence’ that requires [an] ability to do otherwise, and the second clause indicating a 
‘freedom of spontaneity’ that does not require such an ability” (196). The ‘or rather’ is then 
read either as a retraction or else as an indication that the will can exhibit either kind of 
freedom.  Ragland (2006c), however, convincingly argues against both readings, as does 15
Schmaltz himself. Instead, it is “much more plausible that Descartes intended the second 
clause to further develop or clarify the first clause’s claim that freedom requires alternative 
possibilities…‘or rather’ means ‘in other (better) words’” (Ragland, 390).   16
 Though controversial, Descartes’s acceptance of the Two-Way Ability Thesis together 
together with the Self-Determination Thesis is buttressed by the fact that apparent es-
pousals of both appear throughout Descartes’s writings. This lends significant support to 
the idea that Descartes views them as intimately related. Although for reasons of space I’m 
not able to defend these points at proper length, others have done so. (See especially 
Ragland 2006b and 2016, Chapters 3-6.) Readers who nonetheless remain wary of 
Descartes’s commitment to the Two-Way Ability Thesis and/or the Self-Determination The-
sis are encouraged to read this paper conditionally: if Descartes accepts both the Two-Way 
Ability and the Self-Determination Theses, how should we understand them? 
 Another element of Descartes’s conception of human freedom emerges in the quo-
tation from the Fourth Meditation with which we began. It continues as follows: 
…In order to be free, there is no need for me to be inclined in both ways; on the con-
trary, the more I incline in one direction—either because I clearly understand that rea-
 Athough the second clause only requires that we feel undetermined, rather than actually be undeter14 -
mined, there are good reasons to think the latter is also intended. As Ragland (2006b) notes, 
[D]escartes is probably using the word ‘feel’ (sentiamus) here to reiterate his frequently stated 
opinion that we have an inner feeling or experience of freedom. Descartes suggests that this ex-
perience of freedom is clear and distinct, and hence (given the divine guarantee) veridical. So if in 
the experience of freedom we feel undetermined, we really are undetermined. (381) 
Ragland (2006a) also points out that in the text immediately following the ‘or rather’ passage Descartes 
only talks about non-determination itself, not the feeling of such; this strongly suggests that it’s the 
former that matters most. But not everyone agrees—see, for example, Cunning (2010, 2014b).
  For the retraction readings, see Gilson (1913) and Beyssade (1994). The most prominent proponent 15
of the either-or reading is Kenny (1972).
 Ragland provides a list of others who advance this sort of reading (p. 390, footnote 30).16
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sons of truth and goodness point that way, or because of a divinely produced disposition 
of my inmost thoughts—the freer is my choice. Neither divine grace nor natural knowl-
edge ever diminishes freedom; on the contrary, they increase and strengthen it. But the 
indiﬀerence I feel when there is no reason pushing me in one direction rather than an-
other is the lowest grade of freedom; it is evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but 
rather of a defect in knowledge or a kind of negation… (CSM II, 40) 
As this passage makes clear, Descartes thinks that human freedom is not something that 
requires one to be indiﬀerent between alternatives. In the 1645 note Descartes clarifies that 
by ‘indiﬀerence’ he means “the state of the will when it is not impelled one way rather than 
another by any perception of truth or goodness” (CSMK, 245). Indiﬀerence is thus a matter 
of motivational ambivalence, and it admits of degrees: a person is “more indiﬀerent the fewer 
reasons he knows which impel him to choose one side rather than another” (CSM II, 
233).  Accordingly, we arrive at the following: 17
5. No Indiﬀerence: S’s being indiﬀerent between alternatives is not a necessary con-
dition of S’s φ-ing freely.  18
 The final two Cartesian commitments concern the determination of the will by the 
intellect. As noted in §II, Descartes takes judgments and choices to require the operation of 
both the intellect and will, since the will is unable to form a judgment or choose unless the 
intellect first presents it with a proposition or potential course of action. There are thus 
mental or intellectual preconditions for any act of will; if these conditions together with the 
psychological laws are also suﬃcient, then intellectual determinism follows. But Descartes 
is averse to global intellectual determinism: although the contents of the intellect may some-
times determine the will to act in a particular way, they do not always do so. For God “has 
given me the freedom to assent or not assent in those cases where he did not endow my 
intellect with a clear and distinct perception” (CSM II, 42), and in such cases “[the will has] 
the freedom to direct itself, without the determination of the intellect, towards one side or 
the other” (CSM II, 260). Of course, for any form of determinism D, even if Descartes denies 
D it doesn’t follow that freedom is incompatible with D. The reality of freedom and the falsity 
 In the 1645 note Descartes distinguishes two senses of ‘indiﬀerence’. In the first sense, indiﬀerence is 17
motivational ambivalence—i.e. as a lack of impulsion by any perception of truth or goodness. In the 
second sense, indiﬀerence is two-way power—i.e. “a positive faculty of determining oneself to one or 
other of two contraries” (CSMK, 245). Descartes takes indiﬀerence in the second sense to be necessary 
before, but not after, an act of will is elicited, while denying that indiﬀerence in first sense is a necessary 
condition of acting freely at any time (CSMK, 245).
 Although Descartes takes the No Indiﬀerence Thesis to characterize human freedom, it is not true of 18
divine freedom: “If some reason for a thing’s being good had existed prior to [God’s] preordination, this 
would have determined God to prefer those things which was best to do” (CSM II, 294). This suggests 
that were God not indiﬀerent prior to creation, God would have been determined in his actions (namely, 
to do that which was best) and hence not free. So at least prior to creation, God enjoyed a radical freedom 
of indiﬀerence. For more on human versus divine indiﬀerence, see Ragland (2006b, 382-283).
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of determinism do not imply the falsity of compatibilism. However, there’s a good case to 
be made that Descartes is a compatibilist when it comes to freedom and a restricted form of 
intellectual determinism. 
 To see why, consider the concluding sentence of the main Fourth Meditation passage 
that has been our focus so far: 
…For if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never have to deliberate 
about the right judgment or choice; in that case, although I should be wholly free, it 
would be impossible for me ever to be in a state of indiﬀerence. (CSM II, 40) 
As this passage indicates, Descartes thinks that we would remain free even were we contin-
uously (and, presumably, exclusively) presented with clear and distinct (CD-) perceptions, 
and hence never indiﬀerent—i.e. never not impelled by a perception of truth or goodness. 
(Terminological note: since clarity and distinctness come in degrees, I’ll reserve the use of 
‘CD-perception’ to stand for perceptions that are completely clear and distinct, or at least 
clear and distinct enough to compel assent.) Indeed, the possibility of “perfectly enlightened” 
free agents—i.e. ones that continuously enjoy nothing but CD-perceptions—is explicitly 
countenanced a short while later: 
God could easily have brought it about that without losing my freedom, and despite the 
limitations of my knowledge, I should nonetheless never make a mistake. He could, for 
example, have endowed my intellect with a clear and distinct perception of everything 
about which I was ever likely to deliberate; or he could simply have impressed it unfor-
gettably on my memory that I should never make a judgment about anything which I did 
not clearly and distinctly understand. (CSM II, 42; cf. CSM I, 205) 
Relevant here is the Cartesian doctrine of (what I’ll call) CD-Determination—i.e. the thesis 
that CD-perception compels assent.  More formally: 19
6. CD-Determination: Necessarily, for any subject S and course of action/proposition 
φ, if S CD-perceives φ, then S chooses/judges that φ.  20
As Descartes notes, “[m]y nature is such that so long as I perceive something very clearly 
and distinctly I cannot but believe that it is true” (CSM II, 48; cf. CSMK, 234). Likewise, the 
“will of a thinking thing is drawn voluntarily and freely (for this is the essence of will), but 
nonetheless inevitably, toward a clearly known good” (CSM II, 117). The will is thus deter-
mined to pursue/aﬃrm whatever it CD-perceives as good/true, and likewise to avoid/reject 
whatever it CD-perceives as bad/false. 
 It’s worth noting that Descartes doesn’t just think it’s possible for an agent to be per-
fectly enlightened; he thinks there are perfectly enlightened agents. In a 1644 letter to Mes-
 Cottingham (1993) takes this to be “the central doctrine of Descartes’ Fourth Meditation” (64).19
 Here again I suppress time indices for ease of exposition. Note that given the so-called “Truth Rule”—20
i.e. necessarily, for any S and any p, if S CD-perceives that p, then p is true—it follows that, necessarily, 
if S CD-perceives p, then S truly believes that p.
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land, for example, Descartes draws an analogy between the state of our will in cases of CD-
perception and that of “the blessed” in heaven, for whom “there is nothing in the intellect 
except light” (CSMK, 234). The salient diﬀerence is just that whereas for us such illumina-
tion is typically rare and fleeting, for the blessed it is a constant, persisting state. In both 
cases, however, the will is determined by the intellect and yet remains free.  Thus: 21
7. Enlightened Freedom Thesis: Possibly, S is perfectly (i.e. fully and continuously) en-
lightened, CD-Determination is true, and S nonetheless chooses/judges freely. 
Since perfect enlightenment together with CD-Determination entails a form of intellectual 
determinism—in such circumstances the state of the will is always determined with law-like 
necessity by the state of the intellect—it follows that acting freely is compatible with at 
least one form of determinism. The plausibility of the Enlightened Freedom Thesis thus 
casts doubt on any interpretation of Descartes as a thoroughgoing libertarian—i.e. someone 
who accepts the reality of freedom and denies it’s compatible with all forms of 
determinism.  22
IV. A Puzzle: The Anti-Enlightened Freedom Argument 
So far, I have canvassed Descartes’s central commitments concerning freedom. But there’s a 
hitch—the Enlightened Freedom Thesis seems to conflict with Descartes’s other commit-
ments. Here’s an argument, for any subject S and action φ:  23
 The Anti-Enlightened Freedom Argument 
1. Necessarily, if intellectual determinism is true of S, then S does not have the abili-
ty to do otherwise than S actually does. [plausible assumption] 
2. Necessarily, S φ-s freely only if S has the ability not to φ. [Two-Way Ability The-
sis] 
3. Necessarily, if S is perfectly enlightened, then intellectual determinism is true of 
S. [def. of perfect enlightenment + CD-Determination + def. of intellectual de-
terminism] 
4. Necessarily, if intellectual determinism is true of S, then S does not φ freely. [from 
(1) and (2)] 
5. Necessarily, if S is perfectly enlightened, then S does not φ freely. [from (3) and 
(4)] 
6. Therefore: Enlightened Freedom Thesis is false. [from (5) and Enlightened Free-
dom Thesis] 
 For fuller defense and explication of the idea that the blessed in heaven are perfectly enlightened yet 21
free, see Gilbert (2005). (Thanks to an anonymous referee for the reference.)
 This includes recent interpretations advanced by Newman (2015) and Embry (2016), among others.22
 I’m indebted to Andrew Bailey for this way of setting up the dialectic.23
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The argument appears to be valid, and its conclusion is inconsistent with the possibility 
envisioned by Enlightened Freedom. In extricating Descartes from incoherence, the most 
obvious options are insisting that: [a] Descartes rejects the assumption that intellectual de-
terminism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise, and hence rejects (1), [b] 
Descartes rejects the Two-Way Ability Thesis, and hence rejects (2), [c] Descartes rejects 
the assumption that perfect enlightenment is a form of intellectual determinism, and hence 
rejects (3), [d] Descartes does not aﬃrm the Enlightened Freedom Thesis, and hence ac-
cepts the conclusion (6), or [e] the argument equivocates on the use of ‘ability to do other-
wise’ in (1) and (2), and hence is not in fact valid.  24
 Although each of the above options might be pursued with some plausibility, my focus 
will be on what I take to be the most promising way to defuse the Anti-Enlightened Free-
dom Argument—namely, by opting for [e], the claim that the argument is guilty of equivo-
cation in its use of ‘ability to do otherwise’. I’m not the first to make such a claim, however. 
Before I present my own defense of [e], then, I’ll consider two others—the first by Campbell 
(1999) and the second by Ragland (2016). 
V. Alternative Interpretations: Campbell and Ragland 
A key motivation for the interpretation I favor is that it enables us to see how Descartes’s 
various commitments might be reconciled with the Enlightened Freedom Thesis—i.e. the 
possibility of someone being perfectly (i.e. fully and continuously) enlightened, CD-Deter-
mination being true, and that person nonetheless judging and choosing freely. The strategy I 
wish to pursue involves distinguishes between diﬀerent things that Descartes might mean 
when talking about the ability to do otherwise. A similar strategy has been pursued by oth-
ers, though in diﬀerent ways. In what follows I’ll first explain the interpretation oﬀered by 
Campbell (§V.A) before turning to Ragland (§V.B). Doing so will set the stage for the inter-
pretation that I ultimately favor (§VI). 
A.  Traditional Compatibilism 
Campbell (1999) focuses much of his attention on the apparent tension between passages 
supporting the Two-Way Ability Thesis and those supporting CD-Determination.  Recall:  25
CD-Determination:  Necessarily, for any subject S and course of action/proposition φ, 
if S CD-perceives φ, then S chooses/judges that φ. 
Two-Way Ability Thesis:   S φ-s freely only if S has the ability not to φ. 
Campbell interprets Descartes along traditional compatibilist lines. Traditional compati-
bilists deny that the ability relevant to freedom and responsibility is the “categorical” ability 
 Of course, another option is to insist that Descartes’s position is inconsistent. Although such a view 24
may ultimately be forced upon us, I view the attribution of inconsistency or incoherence to Descartes as 
an option of last resort—i.e. only if there is no viable alternative explanation.
 Compatibilist interpretations of Descartes having been oﬀered by others, including Chappell (1994).25
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to do otherwise. Such an ability requires that it be possible to be in the exact same circum-
stances (actual past + laws) that one actually is in prior to acting, and yet nonetheless do 
otherwise than one in fact does. As it is sometimes put, there must be more than one pos-
sible way for you to “add” to the actual past. Thus: 
Categorical TWA: S is (categorically) able to do otherwise than φ in circumstance C 
only if, possibly, C obtains and S does something other than φ.  26
The categorical ability to do otherwise is clearly incompatible with CD-Determination. 
 In contrast, traditional compatibilists opt for “hypothetical” accounts of ability to do 
otherwise. These are views according to which one is able to do otherwise in a given cir-
cumstance C (where C is, say, the actual past up to the moment of choice together with the 
relevant laws) just in case some relevant counterfactual condition is satisfied. Thus: 
Hypothetical TWA: S is (hypothetically) able to do otherwise than φ in C if and only if 
S would do otherwise were circumstances C* to obtain. 
Diﬀerent versions of Hypothetical TWA place diﬀerent constraints on what C* amounts to, 
and hence vary in plausibility. Perhaps the most historically prominent version has it that 
one is able to do otherwise just in case one would do otherwise were one to want (or try or 
choose) to. This is supposed to capture the thought that freedom requires that there not be 
any external impediments to doing what one wants to do. 
 Why think Descartes advocated a hypothetical rather than a categorical account of the 
ability to do otherwise? The primary source of support comes from the following ‘two sens-
es’ passage from the 1645 note: 
…I do not deny that the will has this positive faculty [of determining oneself to one or 
other of two contraries]. Indeed, I think it has it not only with respect to those actions to 
which it is not pushed by any evident reasons on one side rather than on the other, but 
also with respect to all other actions; so that when a very evident reason moves us in one 
direction, although morally speaking we can hardly move in the contrary direction, abso-
lutely speaking we can. For it is always open to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly 
known good, or from admitting a clearly perceived truth, provided we consider it a good 
thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing. (CSMK, 245; italics added) 
This ‘two senses’ passage is notable for at least three reasons. First, Descartes distinguishes 
two senses in which one is able do otherwise: a ‘moral’ (or ‘practical’) sense and an ‘abso-
lute’ (or ‘metaphysical’) sense.  Second, Descartes claims that in the absolute (but not 27
 Note that Categorical TWA merely states a necessary condition for the relevant kind of ability.26
 By diﬀerent ‘senses’ I just mean diﬀerent readings of ‘can’—not that it has diﬀerent meanings. Accord27 -
ing to linguistic orthodoxy, modal expressions like ‘can’, ‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘may’ are context-sensitive, 
not ambiguous—see (e.g.) Kratzer (2012). Descartes himself, however, wasn’t clear on the nature of the 
diﬀerent readings that might be in play when he uses modal expressions—metaphysical, epistemic, 
moral, etc. For more on Descartes’s metaphysics of modality and related puzzles, see Cunning (2014a).
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moral ) sense, we are always able to do otherwise than we in fact do—even in cases of CD-28
perception. Third, the final clause (or “proviso”) appears to provide an example of the way 
in which we are able to do otherwise—namely, by considering a reason to do otherwise. 
 Notice, however, that if being able to do otherwise in the absolute sense required the 
categorical ability to otherwise, then we would not be able to do otherwise than we in fact 
do in cases of CD-perception. For according to CD-Determination, it is impossible for 
someone to CD-perceive that p without judging that p, and this is clearly incompatible with 
the categorical ability to otherwise.  As Campbell points out, the same problem wouldn’t 29
arise if Descartes were to accept something along the lines of Hypothetical TWA instead. 
Interpreting the moral ability to do otherwise categorically and the absolute ability to do oth-
erwise hypothetically might therefore seem promising. 
 Indeed, adopting such a view allows for a straightforward response to threat posed by 
the Anti-Enlightened Freedom Argument. For given the moral-absolute distinction, the first 
two premises will be ambiguous—do they concern the ability to do otherwise in the moral 
sense, or merely the absolute sense? Either way, the argument will turn out to be unsound. 
For suppose first that both premises—i.e. (1) and (2)—concern the ability to do otherwise 
in the moral sense. Then it turns out that while premise (1) is true—intellectual determin-
ism is indeed incompatible with the moral (i.e. categorical) ability to do otherwise—
premise (2) is false, since freedom only requires the absolute (i.e. hypothetical) ability to do 
otherwise. Alternatively, suppose it’s the ability to do otherwise in the absolute sense that 
is at issue. Then the situation is reversed: premise (2) is true—freedom requires the abso-
lute ability to do otherwise—but premise (1) is not—intellectual determinism is perfectly 
compatible with such. So although each of the first two premises are true under one possi-
ble reading, there is no reading under which both are true. 
 Despite its evident attractions, this interpretation is ultimately untenable. I take the 
following to be perhaps the most serious objection (cf. Ragland 2006a): 
 Main Objection to Hypothetical TWA 
1. The hypothetical ability to do otherwise is compatible with global intellectual 
determinism. 
2. Cartesian freedom is not compatible with global intellectual determinism. 
3. Therefore, Cartesian freedom requires more than the hypothetical ability to do 
otherwise. 
The first premise is fairly uncontroversial, and the second premise receives strong textual 
support from Descartes’s exchange with Gassendi in the Fifth Set of Objections (see CSM II, 
 Lennon (2013) demurs, insisting that “absolute possibility is the permissibility generated by the hy28 -
perbolic or metaphysical doubt in the service of unshakeable certainty” while “moral possibility concerns 
the practical generation of that doubt, [which] is very diﬃcult, hardly possible” (240). On this reading 
of the two senses passage, that “the recovation of assent to a clear and distinct perception is possible in 
both senses—both morally (or practically) and absolutely (or metaphysically)” (241). For a response to 
Lennon, see Embry (2016), fn. 9.
 Or at least the direct categorical ability to do otherwise—I’ll return to this point in Section VI.D.29
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219ﬀ), alluded to earlier. For in response to Gassendi’s apparent espousal of global intellec-
tual determinism and rejection of the will’s indiﬀerence, Descartes denies that global intel-
lectual determinism obtains. He insists not only that the will is free, but also that in order 
to be capable of guarding against error—given that God is not a deceiver—the will must 
have “the freedom to direct itself, without the determination of the intellect, towards one 
side or the other” in cases of unclear perception (CSM II, 260). The underlying structure of 
Descartes’s reasoning appears to be this: if the will is always caused (and entailed) by the 
intellect—that is, if the determinism Gassendi proposes is true even in cases of unclear percep-
tion—then the will is not free, and God does not enjoy impunity. But the will is free, and at 
least in cases of unclear perception it is not determined by the intellect to will as it does. 
The problem is that this line of argument would be incongruous if Descartes were commit-
ted to a version of Hypothetical TWA, since it’s not clear why the ability to do otherwise so 
understood would be threatened by global intellectual determinism. So it’s doubtful that 
Descartes espoused a hypothetical account of the ability to do otherwise, understood along 
traditional lines.  30
B. Limited Libertarianism 
It’s possible, however, that Descartes had a non-traditional hypothetical account of the “abso-
lute” ability to do otherwise in mind. Indeed, a more promising interpretation emerges if 
we understand the relevant ability in the following schematic fashion: 
Absolute TWA: S is (absolutely) able to do otherwise than φ in C if and only if S 
would be categorically able to do otherwise were certain circumstances C* to obtain. 
Like Hypothetical TWA, Absolute TWA stands for a family of views, ones that diﬀer de-
pending on what, exactly, ‘certain circumstances’ amount to. The main diﬀerence between 
the traditional hypothetical account and this “nontraditional” one is that the traditional ac-
counts involve a regular ‘would’-counterfactual in the analysans—i.e. ‘S would do other-
wise…’—while the nontraditional account involves an additional embedded modal claim—
e.g. ‘S would be categorically able to do otherwise…’. Absolute TWA thus captures a kind of 
hypothetical categorical ability. 
 This is the interpretation of the ‘two senses’ passage favored by Ragland (2016). To see 
why, let’s take another look: 
…when a very evident reason moves us in one direction, although morally speaking we 
can hardly move in the contrary direction, absolutely speaking we can. For it is always 
open to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good, or from admitting a clearly 
perceived truth, provided we consider it a good thing to demonstrate the freedom of our 
will by so doing. (CSMK, 245) 
 For an extensive catalogue of other prominent views concerning freedom and the ability to do other30 -
wise espoused in the seventeenth century, see Sleigh, Chappell, and Della Rocca (1998). For a more 
contemporary—and influential—book-length discussion, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998).
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The final sentence is naturally read as an explanation (‘for’) of the sense in which ‘absolute-
ly speaking’ we can move in the contrary direction, and it’s the only clue Descartes gives us 
as to what it amounts to. And it’s amenable to a gloss along the lines of Absolute TWA: in 
cases of clear (and presumably distinct ) perception, although morally—i.e. categorically—31
speaking we can’t do otherwise than we actually do, absolutely speaking we can because it 
would be categorically open to us to hold back were we to have a reason to do so. On this 
reading, the proviso is taken to be an example of a relevant way in which things might be 
diﬀerent, and in virtue of which we count as choosing or judging freely. That the proviso is 
an example rather than part of an analysis of what’s required for such an ability is strongly 
suggested by the fact that it would be woefully inadequate otherwise—it would be implau-
sibly narrow. When viewed merely as an example of the more general type of having at least 
some reason (however negligible), though, it’s more plausible. 
 So there’s reason to think Descartes advocated something like this: 
Absolute TWA*: S is (absolutely) able to do otherwise than φ in C if and only if S 
would be categorically able to do otherwise were S to have a reason not to φ. 
Unlike Hypothetical TWA and Categorical TWA, Absolute TWA* analyzes one (sense of) 
ability to do otherwise—i.e. “absolute” ability—partly in terms of another—i.e. “categori-
cal” ability. We arguably enjoy the former whenever we enjoy the latter, and even when we 
can’t “morally” do otherwise we still count as being “absolutely” able to do otherwise so 
long as the relevant counterfactual in Absolute TWA* holds. And since (on Descartes’s pic-
ture) it is satisfied with respect to all our choices/judgments, even when we’re faced with 
nothing but CD-perception, it follows that we’re absolutely able to do otherwise even when 
perfectly enlightened. On the assumption that freedom merely requires the absolute (rather 
than moral) ability to do otherwise, then, this interpretation is able to defuse the threat 
posed by the Anti-Enlightened Freedom Argument in much the same way Campbell’s does
—premise (1) would be true  
 As an anonymous referee points out, the passage only mentions clearly perceived truths, rather than 31
clearly and distinctly perceived truths. And as Descartes notes in the Principles, it’s possible for an idea to 
be clear without being distinct (CSM I, 207-8). I nonetheless think the assumption of distinctness is 
plausible in contexts where the possibility of clear but indistinct ideas is neither remarked upon nor 
obviously relevant. This includes the ‘two senses’ passage as well as many others (including those writ-
ten by commentators—see, for example, CSM II, 280-281). Take, for instance, the previously cited claim 
in the Fourth Meditation that “if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never have to 
deliberate [and] although I should be wholly free, it would be impossible for me ever to be in a state of 
indiﬀerence” (CSM II, 40; cf. CSM II, 104; CSM II, 291-292). This passage and others like it are stan-
dardly—and rightly, to my mind—cited in support of the Cartesian doctrine of that clear and distinct per-
ception compels assent. But there’s no mention of distinctness, only clarity. So—going back to the ‘two 
senses’ passage—although Descartes may have meant we can always “hold back” from pursuing a clearly 
but not necessarily distinctly known good or from admitting a clearly but not necessarily distinctly perceived 
truth, I doubt it. Summarily put: in contexts where the possibility of clear yet indistinct ideas is irrele-
vant, it’s plausible to interpret talk of clarity as convenient shorthand for clarity and distinctness.
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 What’s more, the ability specified by Absolute TWA* is incompatible with Gassendi-
style global intellectual determinism. For even if S were to have a reason not to φ (assuming 
S doesn’t already), given global intellectual determinism it wouldn’t follow that S would be 
able to categorically do otherwise. On the contrary, S wouldn’t be able to do so, since S 
would be determined to choose/judge whatever her intellect presented as best/most proba-
ble, regardless of any countervailing reasons. The incompatibility of Absolute TWA* with 
global intellectual determinism marks a significant improvement over the standard compat-
ibilist interpretation advocated by the likes of Campbell. On the resulting view, all of 
Descartes’s purported commitments are consistent and Descartes’s reply to Gassendi makes 
sense. That’s a substantial mark in favor of Ragland’s interpretation. 
 But there are also problems. In particular, the counterfactual gloss of the ‘two-senses’ 
passage is admittedly somewhat forced—notice there are no ‘had’s, ‘were’s, or ‘would’s in it
—and there’s otherwise little textual support for Absolute TWA*. So it would be nice if we 
could avoid placing too much weight on such a thin reed. Indeed, the latter worry applies to 
any interpretations that treats the moral-absolute distinction as central to Descartes’s theo-
ry of free will, including Campbell’s and (to a lesser extent) Ragland’s.  For although any 32
fully adequate interpretation will need to explain the moral-absolute distinction—the au-
thenticity of the note is not in doubt—it turns out there are good reasons to discount its 
interpretative significance. Although space constraints prevent careful consideration here, 
Lennon (2013) argues persuasively that the significance traditionally assigned to it is mis-
placed. He summarizes the note’s problematic status as follows: 
The evidence is that Descartes struggled over the [1645 note], never sent it into the 
world, never commented on it elsewhere, and made no further use of it. For all we know, 
it is a record of views that he rejected. (247) 
This fact should accordingly make us wary of any interpretation that treats the moral-abso-
lute distinction as the cornerstone of Descartes’s theory. Together with the forced nature of 
the counterfactual reading of the ‘two senses’ passage, we therefore have reason to the con-
tinue searching for a more satisfying interpretation of Descartes’s conception of freedom. 
VI. Restricted Incompatibilism 
Like the other interpretations considered so for, the interpretation I favor—which I’ll call 
“Restricted Incompatibilism”—preserves the idea of two-way power or ability as being es-
sential to the will. But it does so in a novel way. And that’s by appealing to the indepen-
dently motivated distinction between possessing a power, exercising a power, and being in a posi-
tion to exercise a power. Roughly put, to exercise a power is to make use of it, while to be in a 
 Ragland takes the categorical vs. hypothetical-categorical distinction to be implicit in other passages 32
besides ‘two senses’ one. To the extent that he’s right, this helps blunt the worry. Indeed, Ragland could 
in principle divorce the categorical vs. hypothetical-categorical distinction from the moral vs. absolute 
distinction by denying that the former is operative in the ‘two sense’ passage, but nonetheless insisting 
that it’s operative elsewhere. I’m not able to pursue this possibility at proper length, but as we’ll see, 
doing so would bring our respective interpretations considerably closer together.
 15
position to exercise a power is to (a) possess a power and (b) for there to be no internal or 
external impediments to the exercise of that power (cf. Kenny 1975, 133). In order to pos-
sess a power or ability one needn’t exercise it, nor even be in a position to exercise it. I pos-
sess the ability to jump, for example, even when I’m not exercising it (e.g. when I’m stand-
ing still) and even when I’m not in a position to do so (e.g. when I’m sleeping). We can 
thus distinguish a power’s possession conditions—i.e., the conditions required to possess that 
power—from its opportunity conditions—i.e. the conditions that must be met in order to be 
able to exercise that power. 
 The distinction I’m concerned to draw is an intuitive one, and similar distinctions have 
been drawn by others. For example, van Inwagen (1983) writes the following: 
Clearly there is a distinction to be made between a…general ability, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the power to exercise it on a given occasion. This is true despite the 
fact that the same words might be used in both kinds of situation (‘can speak French’’; 
‘can move her left arm’; ‘can play the flute’). (13) 
In a similar vein, Mele (2003) writes: 
Although I have not golfed for years, I am able to golf. I am not able to golf just now, 
however. I am in my oﬃce now, and it is too small to house a golf course. The ability to 
golf that I claimed I have may be termed a general practical ability. It is the kind of ability 
to A that we attribute to agents even though we know they have no opportunity to A at 
the time of attribution and we have no specific occasion for their A-ing in mind. The 
ability to golf that I denied I have is a specific practical ability, an ability an agent has at a 
time to A then or to A on some specified later occasion. (447) 
It’ll be useful to follow Mele in distinguishing between “general” and “specific” abilities. 
However, it’s important to keep in mind that there’s really only one kind of power or ability 
at issue, and that the general-specific distinction is intended to mark (something like) two 
modes of one and the same underlying power. For the sake of clarity, then, I’ll regularly re-
vert to the distinction between possessing a power and being in a position (and hence able) to exer-
cise it.  
 Given the general-specific distinction, we face at least two questions: first, what’s the 
relationship between general and specific abilities? And second, was Descartes aware of it, 
and if so to what degree? Regarding the first question, there are at least two options: 
One…is that general ability is in some sense prior to specific ability: to have a specific 
ability is simply to have a general ability and to meet some further constraint, such as 
having an opportunity. Another proposal is that specific ability is in some sense prior to 
general ability: to have a general ability is simply to have a specific ability under a certain 
range of circumstances. (Maier 2014, Section 1.3) 
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My interpretation is intended to be compatible with either route. So at least for present 
purposes, there’s no need to take sides.  33
 Regarding the second question: I think Descartes was almost certainly aware of the 
distinction between general and specific abilities at some level, to some degree. After all, 
the distinction is an intuitive—and, upon reflection, quite obvious—one, and it’s one that 
pervades much ordinary thought and talk about abilities. Given that Descartes regularly and 
unabashedly traﬃcs in talk of powers and abilities, it’s very likely that he would have em-
ployed the distinction in practice—just as we all do—even if he didn’t explicitly remark 
upon it. But that doesn’t prevents us (as theorists) from doing so—and once we do, we can 
turn our attention back to Descartes and carefully re-consider key texts to see where, and 
when, the distinction might have been implicitly operative. As we’ll see, doing so will allow 
us to articulate with considerably greater clarity and distinctness an otherwise familiar pic-
ture of Descartes’s conception of freedom, and to oﬀer more straightforward interpretations 
of key texts than those currently on oﬀer.  34
A.  General vs. Specific Two-Way Ability 
My main proposal is simple: we can profitably understand Descartes’s view as one according 
to which the possession of two-way power is in fact essential to free will, although such a 
power cannot be exercised unless an agent is in a state of indiﬀerence. It’s therefore only in 
the general sense that the will always has two-way power—in the specific sense, the will’s 
two-way power is limited to cases of indiﬀerence. That’s the basic idea. I’ll now spell it out 
more more fully, and (re-)consider key texts in light of it. 
 Let’s begin with the Two-Way Ability Thesis—i.e. S φ-s freely if and only if S has the 
ability not to φ. Given the general-specific distinction, it can be understood in at least one of 
two ways: 
General Two-Way Ability (TWAG):  S φ-s freely only if S has the general ability not to φ. 
Specific Two-Way Ability (TWAS):  S φ-s freely only if S has the specific ability not to φ. 
On the view I’m proposing, Descartes endorsed TWAG, but not TWAS. It’s of course a fur-
ther question whether, when the opportunity conditions are met, the ability to do otherwise 
is categorical or hypothetical in nature. Recall: 
Categorical TWA: S is (categorically) able to do otherwise than φ in circumstance C 
only if, possibly, C obtains and S does something other than φ. 
 For further discussion of the general-specific distinction, as well as its relevance to contemporary de33 -
bates, see Franklin (2011a, 2015), Vihvelin (2013), and Maier (2015). For more fine-grained distinc-
tions—ones that I’m ignoring in the interest of simplicity—see Clarke (2015).
 There are important similarities (as well as diﬀerences) between the interpretation I oﬀer and those 34
of many others, including Kenny (1972), Ragland (2006a, 2016), and Schmaltz (2008, 192-208). Careful 
comparison with each is beyond the scope of this paper, though I discuss Kenny’s view in footnote 45 
and Ragland’s (2016) view in footnotes 32, 38, 47, 50, and 52.
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Hypothetical TWA: S is (hypothetically) able to do otherwise than φ in C if and only if 
S would do otherwise were certain circumstances C* to obtain. 
Like Ragland, I take Descartes’s writings to strongly suggest the former, though I’m not able 
to defend this point at proper length (cf. Alanen 2002 and Wee 2006, 2014; for a less san-
guine take, see Lennon 2013, 2015). Doing so would require, among other things, saying 
more about the nature of the possibility involved, as well as what exactly the relevant cir-
cumstances C involve, and neither of these is an easy task.  I’ll nonetheless be taking it for 35
granted that the possibility involved is broadly metaphysical in nature (and hence a logical 
possibility, assumings all metaphysical possibilities are logical possibilities). And since my 
focus is squarely on the threat of intellectual determinism, as opposed to physical or theo-
logical determinism, I’ll be restricting C to intellectual (pre)conditions.  As a result, I 36
won’t be appealing to Categorical TWA in full generality. That’s because, as noted above, 
the categorical ability to do otherwise requires that there be more than one possible way for 
you to “add” to the actual past state of the universe, given all the relevant laws—and the 
past presumably includes facts about the physical world as well as (at least potentially) God. 
 In order to make clear the limited scope of my claim, I’ll therefore introduce a more 
restricted version of Categorical TWA (with subscript ‘R’ for ‘Restricted’): 
CategoricalR TWA:  S is (categoricallyR) able to do otherwise than φ in intellectual 
 conditions C only if, possibly, C obtains and S does something 
 other than φ. 
Categorical TWA entails CategoricalR TWA, but not vice versa. Accordingly, on the view I 
favor, Descartes at least embraced the following: 
Cartesian TWAG: S φ-s freely only if S has the general categoricalR ability not to φ. 
 We can now return to the Anti-Enlightened Freedom Argument. On the present 
interpretation—like those of Campbell and Ragland—the argument is guilty of equivoca-
tion. Recall the first two premises: 
1. Necessarily, if intellectual determinism is true of S, then S does not have the abili-
ty to do otherwise than S actually does. 
2. Necessarily, S φ-s freely only if S has the ability not to φ. 
Given the general-specific distinction, premises (1) and (2) are ambiguous—do they con-
cern the categoricalR ability to do otherwise in the general sense, or merely the specific sense? 
 Descartes’s modal metaphysics is a particularly messy aﬀair. See, e.g., Nelson and Cunning (1998) 35
and Cunning (2014a).
 If C were taken to include facts about God’s knowledge or will, for example, the threat of theological 36
determinism would re-appear. Same goes for facts about (e.g.) the state of one’s body and physical de-
terminism. The extent to which intellectual determinism can be neatly divorced from either is none-
theless unclear. For discussion, see Schmaltz (2008), especially Chapters 3-5, and Wee (2006, 2014). 
(Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.)
 18
(Note that for ease of expression I’ll regularly omit ‘categoricalR’; the qualifier should be 
understood as implicit.) Either way, the argument will be unsound. For suppose first that 
both premises concern the ability to do otherwise in the specific sense. Then although 
premise (1) is true—intellectual determinism is indeed incompatible with the specific abili-
ty to do otherwise—premise (2) is false, since freedom only requires the general ability. Al-
ternatively, suppose what’s at issue is the ability to do otherwise in the general sense. Then 
the situation is reversed: premise (2) is true—freedom requires the general ability to do 
otherwise—but premise (1) is not—intellectual determinism (of a certain kind) is compati-
ble with such. In sum: although each of the first two premises are true under one reading, 
there is no reading under which both are true.  37
 This potential resolution of the puzzle might itself seem puzzling, however. For the 
ability at issue is categorical in nature. One might wonder: how is the general ability to do 
otherwise compatible with a form of intellectual determinism, given that the specific ability 
is not? In response, note that, first of all, not only can one possess the ability to do some-
thing without ever actually exercising it, one can possess it without ever being in a position to 
exercise it—the opportunity conditions may never in fact arise. I may have the ability to 
kick a soccer ball, for example, without ever actually having done so (perhaps I abhor athlet-
ics), and without ever being in a position to do so (perhaps I’ve never been near a soccer 
ball). Likewise, a person might have the ability to see despite being in a medically-induced 
coma their entire life. In a similar way, one might have the ability to do otherwise without 
ever exercising it, and without ever being in a position to exercise it—the opportunity may 
have never arisen. Indeed, according to the interpretation on oﬀer, this is precisely the situ-
ation perfectly enlightened agents (including “the blessed” in heaven) find themselves in—
they possess two-way power, but they’re not in a position to exercise it given the continuous-
ly enlightened state of their intellect. To use terminology familiar from recent debates con-
cerning dispositions, their two-way power is “masked” in cases of CD-perception without 
being removed. As Clark (2009) notes: 
[Masking conditions, or “masks”,] prevent dispositions from manifesting without re-
moving the dispositions. A poison’s power to kill when ingested can be masked by an 
ingested antidote (Bird 1998, p. 228). A glass’s fragility can be masked by internal pack-
ing that prevents breakage even if the glass is struck (Johnston 1992, p. 233). 
Something similar applies to powers and abilities, which (I’m assuming) do not reduce to 
mere dispositions. (For discussion, see Maier 2014, Sections 1.1-1.2.) CD-perception can 
 Notice that the structure—though not the substance—of this response is the same as the one avail37 -
able to Campbell, as well as Ragland. It’s also worth noting that the proposed response to the Anti-En-
lightened Freedom Argument is akin to how the “new dispositionalists” respond to Frankfurt-style cas-
es. (Thanks to John Maier (p.c.) for this point.) In brief, the new dispositionalists think that agents in 
Frankfurt-style cases lack the specific ability to do otherwise but have the general ability to do other-
wise, and that moral responsibility (as well as acting freely) only requires the latter. For critical discus-
sion, see Clarke (2009), Franklin (2011b), and Maier (2014), section 5.2.
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thus be thought of as a masking condition—it prevents the manifestation of agents’ two-
way power without removing it. 
 Although the worry about the compatibility of the possession of (categoricalR) two-
way power and intellectual determinism may persist, it helps to keep in mind that the pos-
session of such a power is not compatible with all forms of intellectual determinism. In par-
ticular, on Descartes’s view, although the possession of such a power is compatible with a 
particular (or “local”) form of intellectual determinism—namely, the one that holds of per-
fectly enlightened agents, given CD-Determination and the nature of the mind—it’s not 
compatible with Gassendi-style global intellectual determinism. For suppose an enlightened 
agent were to have a reason to φ as well as a reason not to φ. Then they would no longer be 
fully enlightened. Instead, they’d be in a state of indiﬀerence—i.e. not compelled by CD-
perception—and hence be able to exercise their two-way power. This is contrary to what 
would obtain if global intellectual determinism were true. For given global intellectual de-
terminism, indiﬀerent agents would never be able to exercise (categoricalR) two-way power. 
Instead, they would be determined to choose or judge whatever their intellect presented as 
best or most probable, regardless of the presence of countervailing reasons. 
 The ability specified by Cartesian TWAG is thus akin to the ability specified by Ab-
solute TWA*, which (as we saw above) is also incompatible with global intellectual deter-
minism. The main diﬀerence is that whereas Absolute TWA* is an account of the ability to 
do otherwise in the “absolute” sense, and is formulated using a counterfactual conditional, 
Cartesian TWAG is neither. The latter is an improvement on both counts, given the prob-
lematic status and interpretation of the ‘two senses’ passage together with the fact that 
there are well-known problems plaguing counterfactual analyses in general.  38
 One might wonder: if I’m not in a position to exercise some power, what does it mean to say that I 38
still possess the power? The following seems plausible: I possess the power just in case were the mask-
ing conditions absent, I would be in a position to exercise the power. But then it looks like general cate-
gorical two-way ability and Ragland's hypothetical-categorical two-way ability amount to the same 
thing. (Thanks to Ragland (p.c.) for raising this worry.) In response, I concede that if possessing a pow-
er is to be analysed in counterfactual terms, then the distinction at the heart of my interpretation col-
lapses into (a restricted version of) Ragland’s. The diﬀerence between our overall interpretations would 
then mainly boil down to a diﬀerence in emphasis as well as a diﬀerence in the interpretation of several 
key passages, including the ‘two senses’ , ’or rather’, and ‘automatons’ passages. In particular, whereas I 
emphasize the priority in Descartes’s system of the positive power of self-determination and take it to 
explain two-way power, Ragland emphasizes two-way power more than self-determination and thinks 
that, according to Descartes, “freedom is most fundamentally the ability to do right” (130, emphasis in 
original). Evaluation of the relative merits of the the diﬀerences in emphasis and interpretation is none-
theless outside the scope of this paper. Importantly, though, it’s matter of controversy whether possess-
ing a power, or general ability, is to be analysed or explained in counterfactual terms (for an overview, 
see Maier 2014, Section 3), as illustrated by the debate over dispositions and the so-called “conditional 
fallacy” (for classic discussion, see Shope 1978; for critical discussion, see Bonevac, Dever, and Sosa 
2006). Even if the possession of a power entails the truth of certain counterfactuals, then, it doesn’t 
follow that the former is to be analyzed or explained in terms of the latter. One advantage of my interpre-
tation is that I needn’t take sides on this debate.
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 To sum up the discussion so far: by rejecting the specific (but not general) categorical 
ability to do otherwise as a genuine requirement of Cartesian freedom, we’re able to defuse 
the Anti-Enlightened Freedom Argument as well as make sense of Descartes’s reply to 
Gassendi. In doing so we are also able to avoid appealing to the problematic ‘two senses’ 
passage from the 1645 note. (I’ll return to it below.) The above interpretation therefore of-
fers a more principled explanation of how Descartes manages to happily aﬃrm the Enlight-
ened Freedom Thesis alongside the rest of the candidate commitments in §III.A. 
 This is progress. But of course there’s more to be said, both in fleshing out Descartes’s 
overall conception of freedom and in defending the interpretation of the Two-Way Ability 
Thesis, understood as TWAG rather than TWAS. I’ll begin with the former task, before con-
cluding with the latter one. 
B.  Descartes on Self-Determination and the Divine Will 
Recall the potential ambiguity introduced by the two clauses flanking ‘or rather’ in the main 
Fourth Meditation passage considered at the outset. Like many others, I take the force of 
the ‘or rather’ to be akin to ‘in other (better) words’. Descartes, after all, is quite explicit 
that he is attempting to characterize the will in the “essential and strict sense”, and this is 
the only place he does so. We should therefore take what he says seriously—and what he 
says is that the will essentially involves the (general) ability to do or not to do and that it 
involves acting free of external determination. It’s plausible, then, to take the two clauses as 
distinct but related attempts to characterize the essence of the (essentially free) will. 
 So far, my focus has been on the first clause. But the second clause concerning self-
determination is just as important, if not more so. Indeed, contrary to what’s suggested by 
the initial gloss provided in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes doesn’t equate self-determina-
tion with the mere absence of external compulsion—where ‘external’ plausibly means ‘exter-
nal to the mind (or soul)’—but rather with a “positive power” to determine oneself. This is 
evident from his 1644 letter to Mesland: 
As for animals that lack reason it is obvious that they are not free, since they do not have 
this positive power to determine themselves; what they have is a pure negation, namely the 
power of not being forced or constrained. (CSMK, 234; italics added) 
According to Descartes, animals that lack reason also lack freedom, even though they are 
not “forced or constrained”.  So clearly the absence of (presumably external) compulsion is 39
insuﬃcient for freedom, even though it is necessary. What makes us diﬀerent is that we 
have a ‘positive power’ to determine ourselves, while they don’t. 
 On Descartes’s picture, it is crucially important that we—our selves—are the ultimate 
causal origin or source of our choices and judgments, and thus “in a special way the author 
 I don’t intend to take a stand on whether physical determinism is true with respect to automatons; 39
lack of external compulsion may well be compatible with physical determinism, on Descartes’s view. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting this clarification.
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of [our] actions” (CSM I, 205).  For even when the intellect compels the will’s assent in 40
cases of CD-perception, it is still the intrinsic properties and powers of our intellect and our 
will that work in concert; nothing external to the mind impels us. Throughout his corpus 
Descartes remains steadfast in his allegiance to the thesis that we are free whenever we en-
joy CD-perception, even though our will is determined by the intellect in such circum-
stances, and an understanding of Descartes’s metaphysics of mind helps make clear why 
CD-determination is not only perfectly compatible with but indeed amounts to self-determi-
nation. For CD-perception constitutively involves the making explicit of ideas that are innate 
within us—ideas that we are all (divinely) endowed with as part of our nature, and that 
therefore owe nothing to the outside material world (cf. Sleigh, Chappel, Della Rocca 1998, 
1212-1214). We are thus self-determined in the fullest sense possible in cases of CD-percep-
tion, modulo our general dependence on God. All other cases of perception, by contrast, 
involve obscure and confused ideas that are derived from or tainted by sense perception, 
and hence depend (at least in part) on that which is external to us qua thinking substance 
(soul, mind). In this way, “[t]he independence which we experience and feel in ourselves”—
an independence that makes “our actions praiseworthy or blameworthy”, unlike those of 
animals—is not threatened by CD-perception (CSMK, 277). 
 Further insight and support for the above interpretation can be gained by considering 
the following passage from the Principles: 
That there is freedom in our will, and that we have power in many cases to give or with-
hold our assent at will, is so evident that it must be counted among the first and most 
common notions that are innate in us… [The] freedom which we experienced within us 
was nonetheless so great as to enable us to abstain from believing whatever was not 
quite certain or fully examined. (CSM I, 205-206) 
This passage is noteworthy for two main reasons. First, Descartes explicitly distinguishes 
between the freedom which is ‘in’ or essential to our will and the (we’re assuming, categor-
icalR) power or ability which we have in many—but not all—cases to give or withhold our 
assent. The former we can identify as the power of self-determination (or general two-way 
power), while the latter is most naturally interpreted as specific two-way power, since it’s a 
statement concerning our ability to exercise two-way power in particular circumstances. If 
the latter were essential to the former, we’d expect it to always accompany the will—but it 
doesn’t (or at least that’s what’s implicated by ‘many’ ), so there’s good reason to think 41
that it’s not. Instead, we only have specific two-way power with respect to that which is 
“not quite certain or full examined”, and hence only when we are indiﬀerent—understood, 
per above, as the state of the mind when the will is not impelled one way rather than an-
other by CD-perception, or, equivalently, when we have reasons to assent as well as reasons 
 This is of course supposed to be compatible with God’s ever-guiding and ever-conserving hand. As 40
noted previously, I’m ignoring complications (and possible tensions) in Descartes’s view arising from 
our dependence on God, and God’s absolute control over and perfect knowledge of creation.
 This is what’s known as a “quantity” implicature—saying (e.g.) that you ate some of the cookies im41 -
plicates that you didn’t eat all of them.
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not to assent, however unequal they may be (cf. Kenny 1972; Ragland 2006a, 2016; Lennon 
2013; Dicker 2013). This makes plausible the following: 
9. Necessity Thesis: S has the specific ability to do other than φ only if S is indiﬀerent 
with respect to φ. 
Indiﬀerence is thus an “opportunity condition” for two-way power—i.e. a condition that 
must be satisfied in order for an agent to be able to exercise that power. 
 Second, Descartes says that our freedom is ‘so great’ that it enables us to abstain 
whenever we are indiﬀerent. This suggests that the power of self-determination together 
with indiﬀerence is suﬃcient for specific two-way power: 
10. Sufficiency Thesis: If S has the power of self-determination and S is indiﬀerent with 
respect to φ, then S has the specific ability to do otherwise than φ. 
Of course, Descartes thinks our default state as fallen human beings is one that is rife with 
indiﬀerence, with the vast majority of ordinary perceptions being obscure or confused to 
varying degrees. It therefore follows from the Suﬃciency Thesis that our default state is one 
in which we nearly always have specific two-way power. Such power is thus part and parcel 
of our normal state of indiﬀerence, and a direct consequence of our nature as self-determin-
ing agents. So although as a matter of fact we’re able to exercise (categoricalR) two-way power 
with respect to the vast majority of choices and/or judgments we make, this “specific” abili-
ty is ultimately just a circumstantial manifestation of the core power constitutive of freedom—
i.e. the abiding power of self-determination.  42
 It’s worth noting that the view I’m oﬀering shares important similarities with the view expounded by 42
Kenny (1972), who argues that Descartes “thinks that freewill often does consist in liberty of indiﬀer-
ence [understood as a two-way power], but that sometimes it consists only in liberty of spontaneity, and 
that is all that is essential to it” (18). However, instead of characterizing spontaneity as the positive 
power of self-determination (as I have), Kenny characterizes it in terms of wanting: “we [enjoy liberty of 
spontaneity] in doing something if and only if we do it because we want to do it” (17). More important-
ly, Kenny’s distinction between the two kinds of liberty is sharp in a way that mine is not: on my view, 
the positive power of self-determination manifests itself as specific two-way power in cases of indiﬀer-
ence. It’s at best misleading to think of the agent as enjoying distinct kinds of freedom or liberty, de-
pending on the circumstances; instead, it is one and the same underlying power to act that is operative in 
all circumstances. Indeed, for Kenny, the two kinds of liberty come apart in both directions—the liberty 
of spontaneity, but not the liberty of indiﬀerence, is had in cases of CD-perception, and the liberty of 
indiﬀerence, but not the liberty of spontaneity, is had in cases of “full indiﬀerence”—i.e. when one “sees 
no reason to one side rather than another” (30). I resist such dualism. Another notable diﬀerence is 
that Kenny thinks that Descartes’s theory is incoherent (and, indeed, consistently so—“it is an incoher-
ence which was present in the theory from the beginning”), while I do not (31). Kenny is misled by 
Descartes’s admittedly confusing—but not confused (see below)—remarks about the “degrees” of free-
dom; according to Kenny, Descartes falls into incoherence by thinking that there is a “single scale of 
freedom” while also thinking that there are diﬀerent kinds of freedom, and which resist linear ordering. 
But on my view, Descartes thinks neither. For a thorough response to Kenny’s worries, and an explana-
tion of where he goes wrong, see Ragland (2006b, 2013, 2016).
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 This interpretation helps shed additional light on the ‘or rather’ passage in the Fourth 
Meditation, which (as noted in §III.A) is intended to explain the sense(s) in which the es-
sence of our will is akin to that of God’s. For when Descartes writes that the will “simply 
consists in our ability to do or not do something”, he is not talking about the specific ability 
to do or not do something, but instead the general ability. That this interpretation is correct 
is strongly suggested by Descartes’s remarks immediately following the ‘or rather’ passage, 
in which he explicitly (a) denies that indiﬀerence is necessary for human freedom, (b) af-
firms CD-Determination, and (c) aﬃrms the compatibility of CD-perception and human 
freedom (CSM II, 40-41). These commitments entail that the will is not always, and of ne-
cessity, in a position to exercise two-way power. It seems exceedingly unlikely, however, that 
Descartes would have been guilty of so blatant a contradiction, and so there’s excellent rea-
son to take the first clause to merely attribute the essential possession of two-way power to 
the will, rather than the ability to always exercise such a power.  43
 Like God, then, we essentially possess two-way power, but unlike God, we’re not always 
in a position to exercise that power. This diﬀerence is not due to a diﬀerence in the nature of 
the will itself, however. Instead, it’s due instead to a diﬀerence in our motivational profiles: 
whereas we (as humans) are merely contingently indiﬀerent, God is essentially indiﬀerent. So 
although the Necessity Thesis and the Suﬃciency Thesis apply to both us and God—we’re 
both only able to exercise two-way power in cases of indiﬀerence—God is unique in always, 
and of necessity, being in a position to exercise that power. 
 This contrast between us and God is remarked upon in the Sixth Replies: 
As for the freedom of the will, the way in which it exists in God is quite diﬀerent from 
the way in which it exists in us. It is self-contradictory to suppose that the will of God 
was not indiﬀerent from eternity with respect to everything which has happened or will 
ever happen; for it is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of in the divine in-
tellect as good or true, or worthy of belief or action or omission, prior to the decision of 
the divine will to make it so… Thus the supreme indiﬀerence to be found in God is the 
supreme indication of his omnipotence. (CSM II, 291) 
Things are diﬀerent for us: 
But as for man, since he finds that the nature of all goodness and truth is already deter-
mined by God, and his will cannot tend towards anything anything else, it is evident that 
he will embrace what is good and true all the more willingly, and hence more freely, in 
proportion as he sees it more clearly. He is never indiﬀerent except when he does not 
know which of the two alternatives is the better or truer, or at least when he does not 
see this clearly enough to rule out any possibility of doubt…[So, unlike divine indiﬀer-
ence,] human indiﬀerence does not belong to the essence of human freedom. (CSM II, 
292) 
 At least we have good reason to think this given the additional assumption (noted from the outset) 43
that ‘or rather’ means ‘in other (better) words’ rather than ‘or instead’ or ‘actually, that’s not right…’. 
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Despite this diﬀerence with respect to indiﬀerence, however, it’s still true that both the di-
vine and the human will possess two-way power, and essentially so. They are also both free 
from external determination—modulo humans’ general dependence on (and potential de-
termination by) God—and hence self-determining. So both clauses describe important 
points of similarity between the divine and human will, and characterize it from compli-
mentary and mutually reinforcing perspectives—just as we’d expect given the context. ,  44 45
 The question remains why Descartes prefers the second clause to the first. Fortunately, 
however, the present interpretation provides a ready answer. For as noted above, the ability 
to exercise two-way power in cases of indiﬀerence is ultimately just a circumstantial mani-
festation of the core power constitutive of freedom—i.e. the abiding power of self-determi-
nation. And that’s because if the will were determined by the intellect in cases of indiﬀer-
ence it would be determined (in part) by obscure and confused ideas derived from or taint-
ed by sense perception, and hence determined (in part) by that which is external to the 
mind.  One thus has the (general and specific) ability to do otherwise in virtue of being 46
self-determining, rather than vice versa. In this way, self-determination is metaphysically 
prior to two-way power, despite both being essential to and characteristic of the will 
(whether human or divine). The second clause therefore clarifies and expands upon the first 
without replacing it.  47
 The present interpretation also sits nicely with another notable textual datum—the so-
called ‘great light’ passage. In his 1644 letter to Mesland, Descartes writes: 
 That these are points of similarity rather than properties that are strictly speaking shared by the divine 44
and human wills is important. For in the relevant passage Descartes clearly states that “no essence can 
belong univocally to both God and his creatures” (CSM II, 292).
 Why does Descartes mention two-way power first, rather than self-determination? It’s hard to be cer45 -
tain, but there are at least two reasons to think it made strategic sense. To begin with, there’s little 
doubt that the characterization of the will as the ability “to do or not to do” accords well with common 
sense as well as common experience, and so the reader would be unlikely to demur. But there’s also a 
not insignificant chance that Descartes had in mind his Jesuit readership, who were well-known for be-
ing staunch defenders of the will’s two-way power—cf. Lennon (2013, 2015).
 Again, I’m bracketing issues concerning our general dependence on God, etc.46
 My reading of the ‘or rather’ passage thus splits the diﬀerence between what Ragland (2016) calls the 47
“expansion” and “clarification” readings (see pp. 86, 89-90). Ragland himself defends the latter, arguing 
that “the second clause is spelling out an implication of the first clause: when we are able to do some-
thing or not (first clause), then we are not determined to do it (second clause). On this reading, the sec-
ond clause enriches Descartes’ notion of freedom not by proposing another kind of freedom distinct 
from two-way power, but by explicating more fully the notion of two-way power itself” (89). On my 
view, the situation is diﬀerent, with the first clause being explained (rather than merely clarified) by the 
second: it is in virtue of being self-determining that we possess the (general as well as specific) ability to 
do otherwise. So although I agree that Descartes is not proposing “another kind of freedom distinct from 
two-way power”, I do think he is proposing another, more metaphysically fundamental kind of power 
(self-determination)—one that guarantees but is not identical to two-way power (in any sense). My in-
terpretation of Descartes’s overall view nonetheless shares many similarities with that of Ragland’s, 
though (as already noted) a full and careful comparison is beyond the scope of this paper.
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I agree with you when you say that we can suspend our judgement; but I tried to explain 
in what manner this can be done. For it seems to me certain that a great light in the in-
tellect is followed by a great inclination in the will, so that if we see very clearly that a 
thing is good for us, it is very diﬃcult—and, on my view, impossible, so long as one continues in 
the same thought—to stop the course of our desire. But the nature of the soul is such that 
it hardly attends for more than a moment to a single thing; hence, as soon as our atten-
tion turns from the reasons which show us that the thing is good for us, and we merely 
keep in our memory the thought that it appeared desirable to us, we can call up before 
our mind some other reason to make us doubt it, and so suspend our judgement, and 
perhaps even form a contrary judgement. (CSMK, 233; italics added) 
As the italicized clause indicates, whenever (and so long as) the ‘great light’ of the intellect 
shines forth, we cannot do otherwise than we actually do. That is, we lack specific two-way 
power so long as the present circumstances—i.e. our total state of mind, including the CD-
perception—remain as they are. But as soon as the great light is dimmed, or otherwise di-
minished (as, say, the result of a change in the level or object of our attention, or the intro-
duction of countervailing reasons), then we are able to exercise the will’s two-way power 
and thus revise our judgment or stop the course of our desire. 
C.  Descartes and “Degrees” of Freedom 
At this point it’s worth noting that there’s an evaluative strain in Descartes’s discussion of 
freedom—one that is readily explained by the present interpretation. Two of the clearest 
attempts to demarcate diﬀerent freedom-related concepts are to be found, first, in the 
Fourth Meditation and, second, in Descartes’s 1645 note: 
[I]t is above all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the 
image and likeness of God. For although God’s will is incomparably greater than mine, 
both in virtue of the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it more firm and 
eﬃcacious, and also in virtue of its object, in that it rangers over a greater number of items, 
nevertheless it does not seem any greater than mine when considered as will in the es-
sential and strict sense. (CSM II, 40; italics added) 
[T]he lowest degree of freedom is that by which we determine ourselves to things to 
which we are indiﬀerent… For a greater freedom consists either in a greater facility in de-
termining oneself or in a greater use of the positive power which we have of following the 
worse although we see the better. If we follow the course which appears to have the 
most reasons in its favour, we determine ourselves more easily; but if we follow the opposite, 
we make more use of that positive power; and thus we can always act more freely in those 
cases in which we see much more good than evil than in those cases which are called 
[indiﬀerent]… But freedom considered in the acts of the will at the moment when they 
are elicited [consists] simply in ease of operation...It was in this sense that I wrote [in the 
Fourth Meditation] that I moved towards something all the more freely when there were 
more reason driving me towards it; for it is certain that in that case our will moves itself 
with greater facility and force.” (CSMK, 245-46; italics added). 
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Descartes is speaking somewhat loosely here about ‘freedom’, given that the essence of the 
will consists in both the (general) ability do otherwise and the positive power of self-deter-
mination, and neither of these come in degrees. What these passages demonstrate, howev-
er, is an awareness of the need for more subtle distinctions concerning possible states of the 
will. In particular, although there’s only one kind of freedom—the core, basic power of self-
determination that enables one to do otherwise in cases of indiﬀerence—Descartes distin-
guishes at least three diﬀerent dimensions along which particular exercises of freedom, or 
states of the will, can be evaluated. In particular, the above passages suggest we can exercise 
our freedom… 
 quality …with more or less, and better or worse, objects as our guide. 
 facility …with greater or lesser ease, or felt exertion. 
 force …with a stronger/weaker will (understood as a measure of absolute strength). 
These diﬀerent dimensions help elucidate some of Descartes’s remarks that are otherwise 
puzzling, in addition to those above. For example, it explains part of the key passage from 
the Fourth Meditation (quoted above) about how divine grace and “natural knowledge” not 
only fail to diminish freedom, but rather serve to “increase and strengthen” it (better quali-
ty objects result in greater facility and force), and how indiﬀerence is the “lowest grade of 
freedom”, because it is evidence of a “defect in knowledge or a kind of negation” (lower 
quality objects, less facility). Note that in each case what’s being evaluated is the overall 
state of the will in relation to the intellect—rather than just the state of the will itself consid-
ered on its own. 
 We’re also able to make better sense of the important and oft-repeated claim that we 
are “at our freest” when a “clear perception [of the good or the true] impels us” (CSM II, 
292; cf. CSM II, 40, 106; CSMK, 245, 342), since this is when we face the least motivational 
resistance and hence are “able to act with most ease”—assent of the will is immediate and 
eﬀortless. Not so for cases of non-CD-perception, when the will is presented with opposing 
reasons (though not necessarily with the same strength) and so inevitably faces some moti-
vational resistance, no matter which way it goes. Thus, although acting freely is an all-or-
nothing aﬀair and talk of one exercise of the will being unqualifiedly “more free” than an-
other doesn’t make sense, talk of one exercise of the will being “more free” than another in 
terms of the former enjoying greater quality, facility, and/or force is perfectly sensible. 
 Given all of this it becomes clear that even though the will enjoys the same positive 
power of self-determination in cases of both CD-perception and non-CD-perception (and 
hence is equally free), it enjoys additional benefits in the former. Indeed, the “highest” form 
of freedom, or “best” state of the will, is not only compatible with but consists in the will 
being compelled by clear and distinct perception. By contrast, being in a position to actually 
exercise categorical two-way power is a sign of intellectual imperfection—we’re only in such 
a position when we fail to clearly and distinctly perceive what to do or believe, and hence 
are indiﬀerent—and it guarantees the presence of at least some motivational resistance. 
 In sum: on the interpretation I favor, there’s only one power or faculty of free will, 
although the way it is manifested may vary depending on the circumstances. In particular, 
although the possession of two-way power is essential to the will, it’s a power that can only 
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be exercised in cases of indiﬀerence, whereas the power of self-determination is a power 
that is always exercised, no matter the circumstances, whenever the will acts. Self-determi-
nation thus enjoys a kind of priority in Descartes’s thought and system. It is the ultimate 
locus of freedom, it is the basis of moral responsibility, it enables one to do otherwise in 
cases of indiﬀerence, and it is not only compatible with but also manifested most fully—
with maximal quality, facility, and force—in the blessed state of rational enlightenment. 
D.  The ‘Two Senses’ Passage 
I find the above interpretation to be compelling. But some obstacles remain, foremost 
among which are a handful of texts that seem to suggest a unrestricted commitment to spe-
cific two-way power—i.e. to us being able to exercise two-way power with respect to all of 
our actions. I’ve already dealt with some, including the ‘or rather’ passage from the Fourth 
Meditation. I’ll conclude by revisiting the ‘two senses’ passage from the 1645 note. 
 To begin with, how are we to understand Descartes’s claim that the will has two-way 
power “not only with respect to those actions to which it is not pushed by any evident rea-
sons on one side rather than on the other, but also with respect to all other actions” (CSMK, 245; 
italics added)? It helps to recall that in his 1644 letter to Mesland (i.e. the ‘great light’ pas-
sage above) Descartes emphasizes how attention is fleeting, and thus how diﬃcult it is to 
maintain a clear and distinct perception—something which, for most people, is a rare occur-
rence and requires focused eﬀort—because as soon as our attention shifts “we can call up 
before our mind some other reason to make us doubt it, and so suspend our judgement, and 
perhaps even form a contrary judgement” (CSMK, 233). Yet Descartes also insists that 
when we “see very clearly that a thing is good for us”, it is “impossible [to] stop the course 
of our desire” so long as “one continues in the same thought” (CSMK, 233). 
 I think Descartes’s remarks in the ‘two senses’ passage can be understood along 
similar lines.  He’s not making the modal claim that the will essentially enjoys specific (cate48 -
goricalR) two-way power with respect to all of its actions; rather, he’s making the de facto 
claim that the will in fact has such power with respect to all of its actions. But that’s not to 
say that the will is able to exercise two-way power at each moment, for in cases of CD-percep-
tion it can’t; rather, it is to say that for each action—including assent to CD-perception—ei-
ther (i) we are in a position to exercise two-way power at the moment of choice, or (ii) 
there is a moment just prior at which the will was able to exercise such an ability and as a 
result do otherwise than it in fact did, or (iii) there is a moment just after at which the will 
can exercise such an ability, and hence do something diﬀerent. After all, CD-perception isn’t 
usually forced on us, but rather requires a certain amount of eﬀort to achieve. Our default 
state is one of indiﬀerence, with the mind clouded by obscure and confused ideas. And even 
when CD-perception does come easily, we usually retain control over our attentive gaze, 
and so can easily turn aside and consider something else, thereby preventing our assent 
from being (or continuing to be) compelled.  49
 Kenny (1972) also pursues the strategy of interpreting the ‘two senses’ passage (CSMK, 245) in 48
terms of the ‘great light’ passage (CSMK, 233). (Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.) 
 Ragland (2016) makes similar remarks—see especially Chapter 5.49
 28
 We can therefore distinguish two kinds of specific two-way control: direct and indirect. 
(The ‘categoricalR’ qualifier will remain implicit.) One has direct two-way control over an 
action whenever one is in a position to exercise two-way power at the moment of choice. In 
contrast, one has indirect two-way control when there is a relevant time either prior or pos-
terior to the moment of choice at which the will is able to exercise such an ability and as a 
result do something other than what is done at the moment of choice. The proposed inter-
pretation thus amounts to this: for any particular action A, we always—as a matter of fact—
have direct or indirect two-way control over A. But although this is true of us, it’s not neces-
sarily true of us—things would be diﬀerent in cases of continuous CD-perception, or perfect 
enlightenment.  The kind of specific control we (i.e. humans) actually—though not neces50 -
sarily—enjoy with respect to all of our actions can thus be understood as incorporating a 
backwards-looking “tracing” condition as well as a forward-looking “re-direction” condition:  51
Two-Way Control: S has two-way control over the performance of an action A at time 
t if and only if either (i) S is able to do otherwise than A at t, or (ii) S was able to per-
form some other action B at some relevant time t’ prior to t such that had S B-ed at t’, 
S would have done (or would have been able to do) otherwise than A at t, or (iii) S 
will be able to do otherwise than A at some relevant time t’’ posterior to t. 
Two-Way Control captures the sense in which “it is [de facto!] always open to us [as fallen, 
unenlightened humans] to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good, or from admit-
ting a clearly perceived truth” (CSMK, 245). The subsequent proviso is simply an example 
of how we might be motivated to do so—we might divert our attention and thereby hold 
back because we consider it “a good thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by doing 
so” (CSMK, 245). 
 So even though we lack direct two-way control in cases of CD-perception, and hence 
“morally speaking” can’t do otherwise, we nonetheless as a matter of fact (though not of 
necessity) retain indirect control over them, and hence “absolutely speaking” we can do 
otherwise. The present interpretation thus manages to make good sense of the moral-abso-
lute distinction without treating it as the key to understanding Descartes’s theory of free 
 Similar remarks apply to the ‘automatons’ passage considered earlier. It’s true that whenever we “em50 -
brace the truth, our doing so voluntarily is much more to our credit than would be the case if we could 
not do otherwise” (CSM I, 205), because our lacking the ability to do otherwise in such circumstances 
would amount to our lacking direct or indirect two-way control. And that would mean we weren’t free, 
given that we do (de facto!) have such control over our actions. And that would mean we weren’t moral-
ly responsible, and hence not deserving of credit. (This diﬀers from Ragland’s (2016) interpretation—
see pp. 123-124.)
 Ragland (2006a) likewise appeals to a tracing condition in defending an interpretation of Descartes as 51
a “moderate libertarian” (which is diﬀerent from the “limited libertarian” interpretation defended in his 
2016). I’m appealing to a similar condition but in the service of a diﬀerent view.
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will, as Campbell (1999) does, and without taking it to mark the distinction needed to re-
spond to the Anti-Enlightened Freedom Argument, as Ragland (2016) does.  52
VII. Conclusion 
As remarked at the outset, several seemingly divergent strains of thought are present in 
Descartes’s writings on freedom, with reactions ranging from allegations of incoherence to 
inconsistency to change over time. Although I haven’t directly rebutted any of the specific 
charges, I think the interpretation I’ve oﬀered—one that draws from all of Descartes’s major 
writings as well as his letters, and on which Descartes’s view is plausibly coherent, consis-
tent, and stable—suﬃce for optimism on this score. In addition, it fairs better than the oth-
er interpretations I’ve briefly considered—by Campbell (1999) and Ragland (2016)—in not 
only providing a straightforward and plausible resolution of the puzzle presented by the 
Anti-Enlightened Freedom Argument but also providing a straightforward and plausible 
interpretation of the key texts that motivate it. What’s more, I’ve done so by appealing to an 
independently motivated and intuitively plausible distinction between possessing a power, 
exercising a power, and being in a position to exercise it—one that is latent in much ordi-
nary thought and talk about powers and abilities, and so almost certainly one that would 
have been employed by Descartes as well. 
 Ragland considers three ways of understanding the will’s “absolute” two-way power with respect to 52
all its acts: 
According to the first way, our possession of such power implies that all of our volitions are un-
determined [at least by the intellect]. According to the second, it implies that some are undeter-
mined. But on the third way, it does not imply that any volutions are ever undetermined. (130) 
Ragland defends the third interpretation, whereas I endorse the second.
 30
References 
Alanen, Lili. 2002. “Descartes on the Will and the 
Power to do Otherwise.” In Emotions and Choice 
from Boethius to Descartes, edited by Henrik Lager-
lund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri, 279-298. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Beyssade, Michelle. 1994. “Descartes’s Doctrine of 
Freedom: Diﬀerences between the French and 
Latin Texts of the Fourth Meditations.” In Rea-
son, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartes’s Meta-
physics, edited by John Cottingham. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Bonevac, Daniel, Josh Dever, and David Sosa. 2006. 
“The Conditional Fallacy.” The Philosophical Re-
view 115: 273–316. 
Campbell, Joseph Keim. 1999. “Descartes on Spon-
taneity, Indiﬀerence, and Alternatives.” In New 
Essays on the Rationalists, edited by Rocco J. Gen-
naro and Charles Huenemann, 179-199. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Chappell, Vere. 1994. “Descartes’s Compatibilism.” 
In Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartes’s 
Metphysics, edited by John Cottingham, 177–190. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Clarke, Randolph. 2009. “Dispositions, Abilities to 
Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.” 
Mind 118: 323–351. 
Clarke, Randolph. 2015. “Abilities to Act.” Philoso-
phy Compass 10 (12): 893–904. 
Cottingham, John. 1993. A Descartes Dictionary. Wi-
ley-Blackwell. 
Cunning, David. 2007. “Semel in Vita: Descartes’ 
Stoic View on the Place of Philosophy in Human 
Life”. Faith and Philosophy 24: 165–184. 
Cunning, David. 2010. Argument and Persuasion in 
Descartes’ Meditations. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Cunning, David. 2014a. “Descartes' Modal Meta-
physics.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2014 Edition), edited by Edward Zalta. 
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2014/entries/descartes-modal/>. 
Cunning, David. 2014b. “The First Meditation: Di-
vine Omnipotence, Necessary Truths, and the 
Possibility of Radical Deception.” In The Cam-
bridge Companion to Descartes’s Meditations, edited 
by David Cunning, 68-87. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Descartes, René. 1984–1985. The Philosophical Writ-
ings of Descartes, Volumes I and II, translated by 
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoﬀ, and Dugald 
Murdoch (CSM). Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Descartes, René. 1991. The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, Volume III: The Correspondence, translat-
ed by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoﬀ, 
Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (CSMK). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dicker, Georges. 2013. Descartes: An Analytical and 
Historical Introduction, Second Edition. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Embry, Brian. 2016. “Descartes on Free Will and 
Moral Possibility.” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research. 
Frankfurt, Harry. 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and 
Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Philosophy 66: 
829-839. 
Fischer, John Martin. 1999. “Recent Work on Moral 
Responsibility.” Ethics 110: 93-139. 
Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza. 1998. Re-
sponsibility and Control: An Essay on Moral Responsi-
bility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Franklin, Christopher Evan. 2011a. “The Problem of 
Enhanced Control.” Australasian Journal of Philos-
ophy 89: 687–706. 
Franklin, Christopher Evan. 2011b. “Masks, Abili-
ties, and Opportunities: Why the New Disposi-
tionalism Cannot Succeed.” The Modern School-
man 88 (1-2): 89-103. 
Franklin, Christopher Evan. 2015. “Everyone thinks 
that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for 
free will and moral responsibility.” Philosophical 
Studies 172: 2091–2107. 
Gilbert, Christopher. (2005) ‘Grades of Freedom: 
Augustine and Descartes’. Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 86, 201–224. 
 31
Gilson, Etienne. 1913. La libert e chez Descartes et la th 
eologie. Paris: VRIN. 
Greenberg, Sean. MS. “Descartes on Human Free-
dom and the Will: The Meditations as Conative 
Exercises.” 
van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Ox-
ford University Press. 
Jayasekera, Marie. 2016. “Responsibility in 
Descartes’s Theory of Judgment.” Ergo 3 (12): 
321-347. 
Kenny, Anthony. 1972. “Descartes on the Will.” In 
Cartesian Studies, edited by R. J. Butler, 1–31. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Kenny, Anthony. 1975. Will, Freedom, and Power. New 
York: Barnes & Noble Books 
Kratzer, Angelika. 2012. Modals and Conditionals. 
Oxford University Press. 
Lennon, Thomas M. 2013. “Descartes’s Supposed 
Libertarianism: Letter to Mesland or Memoran-
dum Concerning Petau?” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 51 (2): 222–248. 
Lennon, Thomas M. 2015. “No, Descartes Is Not a 
Libertarian.” In Oxford Studies in Early Modern 
Philosophy, Volume VII, edited by Daniel Garber 
and Donald Rutherford. Oxford University 
Press. 
Maier, John. 2014. “Abilities.” In The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), edited 
by Edward Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stan-
ford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/abilities/>.  
Maier, John. 2015. “The Agentive Modalities.” Phi-
losophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1): 113–
134. 
Mele, Al. 2003. “Agents’ Abilities.” Noûs 37: 447–
470. 
Nelson, Alan and David Cunning. 1999. “Cognition 
and Modality in Descartes.” Acta Philosophica 
Fennica: 137-153. 
Newman, Lex. 2015. “Attention, Voluntarism, and 
Liberty in Descartes’s Account of Judgment.” Res 
Philosophica 92 (1): 61–91. 
Ragland, C. P. 2005. “Descartes on Divine Provi-
dence and Human Freedom.” Archiv für Geschichte 
der Philosophie 87 (2):159-188. 
Ragland, C. P. 2006. “Is Descartes a Libertarian?” In 
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Vol. 3, 
edited by Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler 
(eds.), 57–89. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ragland, C. P. 2006a. “Descartes on the Principle of 
Alternative Possibilities.” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 44 (3): 377–94. 
Ragland, C. P. 2006c. “Alternative Possibilities in 
Descartes’s Fourth Meditation.” British Journal for 
the History of Philosophy 14(3): 379-400. 
Ragland, C. P. 2013. “Descartes on Degrees of Free-
dom: A Close Look at a Key Text.” Essays in Phi-
losophy 14 (2): 239-268. 
Schmaltz, Tad M. 2008. Descartes on Causation. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 
Shope, Robert K. 1978. “The Conditional Fallacy in 
Contemporary Philosophy.” The Journal of Philos-
ophy 75: 397–413. 
Sleigh, Robert, Vere Chappell, and Michael Della 
Rocca. 1998. “Determinism and Human Free-
dom.” In Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century 
Philosophy, Volume 2, edited by Daniel Garber 
and M. Ayers, 1195–1278. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2013. Causes, Laws, and Free Will: 
Why Determinism Doesn’t Matter. New York: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Vitz, Rico. 2010. “Descartes and the Question of 
Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.” Journal of Philo-
sophical Research 35: 107–121. 
Wee, Cecilia. 2006. “Descartes and Leibniz on Hu-
man Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise.” 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3): 387-414. 
Wee, Cecilia. 2014. “The Fourth Meditation: 
Descartes and Libertarian Freedom.” In The 
Cambridge Companion to Descartes’s Meditations, 
edited by David Cunning, 186-204. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 32
